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Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models typically (as do most models) treat 
government spending as wasteful; such spending does not contribute to enhancing private 
sector utility or productivity. Some researchers have recently introduced productive 
government investment spending into DSGE models, which has a longer theoretical history, 
adding a supply channel. This paper takes a similar perspective but it also introduces the 
government consumption good into the household utility function and this consumption good 
is supplied by a government production function. While higher government investment can 
increase private output and household consumption in the future, in the short run household 
utility is likely to decline because current consumption of private and government goods is 
shifted into investment. At the same time even though the government consumption good 
enhances household utility, increased production would shift labor from the private sector to 
the public sector, reducing the supply of privately produced consumption goods. This adds 
another supply channel to the usual aggregate demand effects. Although these considerations 
are generally applicable, they have greater import for Euro-area members because fiscal 
policy is the only national macroeconomic policy tool.   
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
In November 2006, the European Commission issued its 2006 EU Economy Review—
Adjustment Dynamics in the Euro Area—Experiences and Challenges.
2  Among its 
conclusions were that the adjustment process in the Euro-area was dynamically stable, but 
this channel can operate slowly and it is not exempt from some overshooting. This Review 
also concluded that procyclical changes in real interest rates could be amplified by asset price 
movements, but theses effects tapered off after two to three years. Meanwhile, country-
specific developments in risk premia, credit constraints and wage-price setting behavior 
along with trends in underlying productivity and labor migration, were powerful explanatory 
factors. In this connection, attention was drawn to shifts in relative competitiveness of traded 
and nontraded goods sectors, noting that competitiveness—real exchange rate—adjustment 
within the Euro-area could be slower than economically or socially desirable causing 
overshooting and cross-country spillovers within the Euro-area. In addition, a key distinction 
was observed in the sustainability of the real convergence process between those economies, 
such as Ireland, that centered on the traded goods sector and those that relied primarily on the 
nontraded goods sector, such as Portugal.
3
 
Based upon this analysis, lessons were drawn for Euro-area policy-makers. (These lessons 
also seem applicable to policy-makers in the non Euro-area, EU countries that have 
currencies that are pegged to the Euro or with tight bands around their ERMII parities (e.g., 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.)) In particular, the efficiency of adjustment 
dynamics within the Euro-area can be enhanced by an acceleration of structural reforms 
including more efficient working of labor and product markets to better reflect 
competitiveness positions. Given the spillover effects, the benefits from policy coordination 
                                                 
2 This paper was prepared under the responsibility of Klaus Regling, Director-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, and Marco Buti, Deputy Director General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Mary 
McCarthy and Max Watson served as co-coordinating editors of the report. 
3 The importance of the traded goods sector in a sustainable real convergence process has been analyzed by 
Bakker and Faisal in a comparison of real convergence by Ireland and Portugal. This analysis was then applied 
to the Baltics economies. 
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among Euro-area members were seen as heightened, while the interplay between 
macroeconomic and structural policies was viewed as having stronger common concerns. As 
regards macroeconomic policies, their focus—perhaps unsurprisingly for the EC staff—was 
on fiscal policy. They advised appropriately that in light of risks of real exchange rate 
overshooting, it was important to avoid a procyclical fiscal stance, which would aggregate 
these risks and indeed increased fiscal consolidation during “good times” would dampen 
swings in the real exchange rate. During country-specific financial booms, the underlying 
strength of revenue performance risks becomes over estimated.  
 
The foregoing analysis and policy lessons were derived in part by employing calibrated 
simulations of a two-country-three-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model (see Chapter VII, Annex). This model fits into the more general category of so called 
New-Open-Economy-Macroeconomics (NOEM).
4 Such general models develop the 
microeconomic foundations for the non-Ricardian behaviors of the household and corporate 
sectors, which allow for long-run, non-neutral fiscal and monetary effects that extend beyond 
the traditional consequences from various nominal (e.g., sticky wages, local currency 
pricing) and real rigidities (e.g., adjustment costs, habit persistence). Ricardian equivalence 
typically does not hold for several reasons most importantly: (i) households have a higher 
discount rate than financial markets, lowering household’s calculated future tax liabilities; 
(ii) some households spending and labor/leisure decisions are influenced by credit 
constraints; and (iii) taxes have a distortionary impact, especially related to labor income. In 
an open economy setting, the resulting long-run differences in the real interest complicate the 
market clearing conditions for international bonds and the exchange rate.  
 
From an international, or open economy, perspective, several aspects of such models are 
noteworthy. One, labor and physical capital are not mobile between countries, although labor 
is mobile—but capital is not—between sectors within a country. Thus, there is complete 
home-country bias in these factors of production. Two, the existence of traded and nontraded 
                                                 
4 See Botman, Laxton, Muir, and Romanov (2007), Casselli (2001), Ganelli and Lane (2002), Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002),  Ganelli (2003), Betts and Devereux (2001), Faruqee and Laxton (2000), and Kumhof, Laxton 
and Muir (2005).  
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goods allows expenditure/production switching in response to changes in competitiveness. 
Multiple definitions of external competitiveness are possible. Three, the modeling of 
financial assets and markets (e.g., equity, bonds) is relatively incomplete. Typically, 
complete home bias and home currency denomination exists for both bonds and equity 
holdings. In the extreme, these assumptions imply no internationally traded assets. In some 
cases, bonds issued by the private or public sector may be traded internationally and/or 
denominated in a foreign currency. Asset stock disequilibrium does not give rise to asset 
flows, rather interest rate parity is assumed, although this may require changing risk 
premium. Intermediation costs and leveraging are implicitly zero. Term structures and credit 
risk and equity premia do not exist. As a consequence, these models do not generally capture 
balance-sheet related credit market frictions (including collateral constraints)—the financial 
accelerator mechanism (see Bernanke, Gerler, and Gilchrist (1999)).
5 Shortcomings in the 
financial sector make it difficult to model the impact of joining a currency union (or moving 
to a peg) in some EU members, such as Portugal and the Baltics.
6 Four, expectations, 
adjustment parameters, and roles of stock disequilibria are crucial for short-run dynamics, but 
professional consensus on appropriate specifications and calibrations is elusive. Thus, short-
run dynamics must be specified with great care.   
 
While the foregoing indicates clearly that considerable theoretical and analytical work 
remains ahead, such calibrated models still now provide a very useful tool to help policy-
                                                 
5  An exception is the version of  ECFIN’s DSGE model developed for the 2006 EU Economy Review. That 
model contained a nontraded construction sector that links a deepening in the mortgage market—the financial 
sector—to developments in the real economy. Households borrow to finance housing investment, facing a risk 
premium that depends on the value of collateral. Newer versions of the IMF’s DSGE model incorporate 
financial accelerator effects.  
6 A simpler calibrated modeling framework has been utilized by Bem and Schellekens (2007) to examine 
“speed limits” pertaining to financial and real convergence in Emerging Europe.  They conclude that while 
speed limits may be hard to determine, the costs of breaking them are likely substantial. Székely and Watson 
(2007) also examine the how expanded access to credit by collateral constrained households—a financial 
accelerator mechanism—can pose new challenges—“speed limits on growth”—for  real convergence process of 
new EU member states. Among the factors that they find limiting convergence potential were wasteful 
government spending/taxation  and government policies that distort the relative price of labor and shift 
resources to nonproductive uses in the private sector.  The “fresh look” at fiscal policy presented in this paper 
can be viewed as addressing these factors that limit convergence potential.   
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makers puzzle through complex economic problems. In this spirit, this paper takes a fresh 
look at fiscal policy, which is particularly germane for economies in the Euro area or pegged 
tightly to it—that is without an independent monetary or exchange rate policy. Econometric 
and calibrated general equilibrium models typically view government as only spending and 
taxing and thereby performing the traditional macroeconomic stabilization function (as 
described say by Musgrave and Musgrave (1973)). Government spending creates a demand 
for goods and services that is supplied by the private sector via an aggregate production 
function (for the whole economy or separate production functions for each sector in multi-
sector context). The economic consequences of such higher government spending depends on 
whether unused factors of production are available—an output gap—and the details of the 
model, including nominal/real rigidities.  
 
Following Musgrave and Musgrave, public finance theory identifies two other government 
functions—redistribution and allocation. While the redistribution function has two basic 
dimensions—intertemporal (e.g., public pensions, interest payments on public debt) and 
contemporaneous (e.g., lump-sum transfers, subsidies); both types of redistribution payments 
are financed by current tax and future taxes (e.g., government borrowing). A vast literature 
exists on demographic change and pensions reform as well as on Ricardian equivalence. In a 
nutshell, whether these transfers—as opposed to their financing modality—have a 
macroeconomic impact depends on whether recipients have a different marginal propensity 
to consume from the rest of society, say because of a different utility function, age cohort, or 
credit/liquidity constraints. Income transfers to liquidity constrained households will boost 
real demand more than equivalent transfers to non-liquidity constrained households. 
Similarly, reducing the share of liquidity constrained households in an economy is one way 
to model the impact of joining the Euro-area for countries, such as Portugal, or the 
implications of the increased presence of foreign banks in the Baltics and Balkans.
7   
 
The allocative function of public finance has its genesis in the provision of public goods or 
more generally social goods—goods that cannot be provided through the market system by 
                                                 
7 A reduction in the country risk premium is also another way to model this phenomenon.  
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the private sector. The government via the budget—political—process determines the 
quantum, price, and distribution of such goods. Within this function, a clear distinction 
should be drawn between the public provision of social goods and the public production of 
social goods. Social goods, such as education, highways, and military hardware, may be 
produced by private firms and sold to the government. Alternatively, the government may 
produce some social goods directly under public management (e.g., primary schooling, waste 
disposal, defense), while using intermediate inputs from the private sector. In addition, these 
two approaches may be combined as a Public Private Partnership (PPP) wherein the private 
sector builds a certain facility (e.g., road) and operates it for a while and then transfers the 
facility to the government (or build-operate-transfer (BOT)).
8 In general, structural 
econometric models (e.g., the Oxford Economic Forecasting Model) and DSGE models (e.g., 
ECFIN, IMF) assume that the government buys goods and services produced by private 
firms. This paper takes the alternative approach developing a model where government 
production has a major role in the allocation of social goods. 
 
II.   THE BASIC GLOBAL INTEGRATED MONETARY AND FISCAL (GIMF) MODEL   
 
The GIMF model developed at the IMF (see Kumhof and Laxton (2007)) adopts a multi-
country NOEM-DSGE framework to evaluate alternative fiscal and monetary policies and 
studies the implications of macroeconomic interdependence. This model has many 
similarities to the multi-country model (Quest II and successors) developed at the EC (see 
Roeger and In’t Veld (1997) and Ratto, Roeger, In’t Veld, and Girardi (2006)), although the 
Fund’s GIMF model also has several distinctive features. GIMF is an extension of other 
NOEM-DSGE models produced at the IMF, including the Global Economy Model (GEM) 
and the Global Fiscal Model (GFM) (see IMF (2004); Botman, Laxton, Muir, and Romanov;  
                                                 
8 For a fuller description, see IMF (2007); Efraim Sadka, Public-Private Partnerships: A Public Economics 
Perspective (IMF Working Paper 06/77); and IMF (2004a, 2004b). 
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and Botman and Kumar (2006)).
9 For purposes of this paper, it is important to note that at 
this stage these models emphasize the provision of social goods by the government rather 
than the production of social goods. What follows will be a streamlined and nontechnical 
description of the GIMF model; a fuller technical treatment is available in Kumhof and 
Laxton (2007). In the full GIMF model, the world consists of N countries but for our 
purposes a two-country version suffices—Home (HO) and Rest of World (RW).   
 
The household sector is comprised of two types: (i) overlapping generations (OG) with finite 
lives, who have access to financial markets; and (ii) liquidity constrained (LC) households 
with finite lives, who do not have access to financial markets and therefore consume their 
current income. Households optimize their expected lifetime utility whose utility function 
comprises consumption, leisure, and real money balances. Consumption and leisure enter 
positively into the utility function, implying that households experience disutility from 
supplying labor; real monetary balances enter separately and consequently the inflation tax 
does not distort household decisions
 .
10 Households consume both domestically produced—
traded and nontraded—goods and imported goods, which allows a home bias in international 
trade. The degree of myopia, risk aversion, and habit persistence and the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution for consumption govern the solution for OG households. Habit 
persistence and myopia are not reflected in the optimality conditions of LC households 
because of their inability to smooth consumption intertemporally through financial markets. 
Myopia and risk aversion introduce a channel for fiscal policy to have non-Richardan effects. 
 
                                                 
9 These models develop extensive micro-economic foundations for behavioral—optimizing, including 
intertemporally—equations for households and firms as well as policy reaction functions to stabilize prices and 
public debt dynamics. With rigorous micro-foundations, these models are not susceptible to the “Lucas critique” 
as were an earlier generation of macroeconomic models (OEFM and MULTIMOD). GEM was the IMF’s first 
multi-country DSGE model, focusing on short-run (quarterly) dynamics employing a representative agent 
paradigm in its initial version. GFM was developed later at the IMF and is an annual DSGE model intended to 
study the medium- to long-term implications of different fiscal policies. Consequently, it uses an overlapping-
generations construct to model non-Ricardian behavior, allowing tax and spending policies to have long-run 
real implications.    
10 As to the fiscal role of money, changes in the inflation tax revenues are offset by lump-sum taxation, avoiding 
indirect distortionary effects via distortionary taxes.   
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OG households hold two types of financial assets—domestic government bonds denominated 
in domestic, and foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency.
11 Complete home bias 
exists in government debt and only one country’s bond is traded internationally. OG 
households receive gross nominal interest payments as well as labor and dividend income. 
All households market their labor to firms via unions who pay a competitively determined 
wage to households, but charge a mark up to firms. The productivity/wage rate of households 
declines at a constant rate over their life spans. This assumption generates a simplified 
lifecycle profile to the model and adds an avenue for non-Ricardian effects of fiscal policy. 
Dividends are distributed in a lump-sum manner from all firms and unions. OG households 
pay lump-sum transfers to the government, which in turn makes lump-sum payments to LC 
households. Labor income and consumption are both taxed at different rates, although 
uniformly across households.   
 
OG households can also consume out of their wealth—a combination of financial assets and 
human capital. Both include the net present value of the after-tax income streams from 
dividends, interest income and from wages. Households discount their future tax liabilities at 
a higher rate than government or the market because an individual household dies before 
some future tax payments are due—the ultimate in tax avoidance!! The infinitely lived 
government and economy compute the full present value of future taxes. A consumption 
share parameter determines the split, the consumption of goods and leisure time coming from 
wealth effects.    
 
The corporate sector consists of manufacturing firms, import agents, distributors, and 
retailers (see Figure 1). Manufacturing firms produce either tradable or nontradable goods, 
utilizing CES production functions with capital and labor. Monopolistic competitive markets 
prevail for the outputs as each firm produces a differentiated output. This implies market 
power in output pricing and excess profits. Excess profits are distributed to households in a 
                                                 
11 The financial sector is as yet underdeveloped in DSGE models, particularly equity markets, credit and equity 
premias. The IMF’s Research Department is undertaking extensions of its GIMF model particularly related to 
the financial sector.  
    9  
lump-sum manner or could be eliminated by assuming fixed costs so that steady state profit 
shares are consistent with data. Manufacturers buy investment goods from distributors and 
buy labor from unions. Manufacturers’ domestic sales go to domestic distributors, while their 
foreign sales go to import agents located in the foreign country. Manufacturers are subject to 
nominal rigidities in prices setting and real rigidities in capital accumulation. Distributors 
buy goods from manufacturers and import agents, selling final output to retailers, 
manufacturing firms (as investors), the government, and import agents in their role as 
providers of final goods. All domestically produced goods and imports must be processed by 
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Unions buy labor from households in a perfectly competitive market, but unions sell 
differentiated labor skills to manufacturers in a monopolistically competitive labor market. 
This market power of unions allows them to increase the real wage above the level consistent 
with perfect competition. Unions distribute to households in a lump-sum in proportion to 
their share in aggregate labor supply; thus these union “dividends” have a neutral impact in 
households’ optimization decisions. Similarly, involuntary unemployment is nonexistent 
because all households supply labor in a perfectly competitive labor market, optimizing their 
utility functions; hours worked will, nevertheless, be less than under perfect competition, 
owing to reduced demand from manufacturers. This reduced labor demand is distributed 
proportionately to households. Wage setting is subject to nominal rigidities in the short run 
but in the steady state, real wages increase at the rate of technological process and adjustment 
costs are zero.  
 
Both local currency pricing and producer currency pricing is allowed. As all imported goods 
sold to households have a domestic cost element from the distribution sector, deviations from 
the “law of one price” occur even in the long run. Adding a distribution sector for traded 
goods allows the model to produce the high ratio of trade to GDP observed in small, highly 
open economies. Unions, import agents, distributors, and retailers do not have production 
costs (i.e., production functions) although they do face adjustment costs. These adjustment 
costs prevent international trade from being excessively responsive to movements in the real 
exchange rate, making it costly to vary the share of foreign produced tradables in total 
tradables. 
 
The public sector consists of the central bank, which conducts monetary and exchange rate 
policy, and the Treasury or Ministry of Finance, which conducts fiscal policy. When the 
exchange rate floats, the central bank uses the nominal interest rate to smooth deviations in 
inflation from its target, the lagged output gap, real growth rate, and fluctuations in the 
exchange rate from its long run value. Depending on the weights assigned to the foregoing, it 
is possible to model a variety of approaches including a Taylor rule (i.e., contemporaneous 
inflation target), inflation targeting or a forward-looking Taylor rule (i.e., forecasted inflation 
rather than contemporaneous is targeted) and nominal-income targeting. By lengthening the 
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horizon to respond to forecasted inflation, policy makers can dampen variability in output, 
while a shorter horizon increases the output volatility and decreases inflation volatility. For a 
large country, the non-Ricardian nature of fiscal policy means that the real interest rate is not 
constant and therefore a moving average of past and future real interest rates is added to help 
anchor the system. For a small country, the world real interest is given. Regardless of a 
country’s size, the risk premium embedded in the nominal interest on government is 
positively linked to the ratio of gross government debt to GDP; consequently, the real interest 
rate is not independent of the government debt ratio.    
 
Exchange rate targeting or pegging is also an option for the authorities, particularly for small 
open economies, allowing them to “import” lower inflation and nominal interest rates. Under 
a currency union, risk premiums related to exchange rate variability are eliminated and a 
common risk free nominal interest rate prevails. The monetary policy rule is formulated 
somewhat differently in a pegged regime from that in a currency union. Under a pegged 
exchange rate regime, the home central bank sets interest rates based on interest rate 
developments in the anchor country and risk premia. Under a currency union with imperfect 
factor mobility, different nominal and real rigidities in two different countries, and home 
country consumption bias,
12 the common central bank sets the policy interest rate based on 
area-wide inflation rates and output gaps, which includes developments in the “home” 
country. Thus, the central bank assigns weight to economic developments in the second 
country (based on economic size) under a currency union unlike in the case of a currency 
peg. For a very small country, this difference in specification of monetary policy is minor. 
Thus with the elimination of exchange rate risk, welfare gains in terms of higher output are 
greater under currency unions than under exchange rate pegging for small countries. For 
larger countries, output volatility would also likely be muted in a currency union compared 
with an exchange rate peg.  
 
                                                 
12 Without these assumptions, it would not be possible to identify one country/economy from another within the 
union. These assumptions would apply most realistically immediately after a country joins a monetary union.  
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That said, output variability is greater under pegged exchange rates than under flexible 
exchange rates with inflation targeting where the exchange rate and interest rates act as 
buffers.
13 In this DGSE model, the larger markups in labor and product markets and greater 
nominal and real rigidities increase the importance of the exchange rate and nominal interest 
rates as shock absorbers (see Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2004)). For an economy with 
the same structure, both output and the current account balance oscillate considerably under a 
pegged exchange rate when shocked say by higher real private spending (Figure 2), although 
they converge relatively smoothly when the exchange rate and nominal interest rates are 
flexible (see Karam, Laxton, Rose, and Tamirisa). Such reverberations could lead to an 
oscillating adjustment dynamic over the medium term even if in the long run the adjustment 
process is dynamically stable. Reducing nominal rigidities and market mark ups would 
dampen these oscillations under a currency peg, pointing to heightened contributions from 
structural reforms. Of course as these two countries become similar in structure and 
preferences as well as enhanced factor mobility between them, their common economy 
adapts quicker and more smoothly to nominal and real shocks. In the interim for the country 
without a monetary or exchange rate policy, fiscal policy could strengthen the operation of its 
automatic stabilizers and could engage in well-timed and calibrated counter-cyclical 
discretionary fiscal policy as warranted. However, if discretionary fiscal policy is not well-
timed and calibrated, it could exacerbate the economy’s oscillations.     
 
                                                 
13 Kirsanova, Vines, and Wren-Lewis (2006) conclude that for small economies with fixed exchange rates, if the 
share of consumers with backward-looking inflation expectations is large enough coupled with a sufficiently 
large demand impact from real interest rates, cycles including unstable ones can be produced. In more open 
economies, this positive feedback loop is diminished, reducing ceteris paribus the risk of instability. 
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In DSGE models, fiscal policy has several instruments. Primary spending consists of 
investment, consumption, and transfers, while four different taxes—labor income, 
consumption, capital income, and lump-sum—are specified. Transfers are paid to LC 
households by redistributing a small fraction of dividend income accruing to OG households. 
This transfer mechanism is assumed not to be distortionary. Interest payments added to 
primary spending represents total government spending. One period nominal bonds are 
issued to cover any budget deficit. To ensure debt stability and thereby avoiding problems 
with monetary policy posed by fiscal dominance, the fiscal policy rule has the primary 
surplus increase when the ratio of government debt to GDP exceeds its desired level. Either 
taxes or spending can be adjusted to implement this rule. The adjustment coefficient for the 
primary surplus is calibrated to avoid large swings in the primary surplus stemming from 
large deviations between and actual and desired levels in the debt ratio.     
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III.   A SECOND LOOK AT FISCAL POLICY 
 
The contribution of fiscal policy in DSGE models is typically limited to demand 
management, reducing the volatility of output, and to the maintenance of public debt 
sustainability.
14 Government services have no impact on consumer utility and therefore social 
welfare. In addition, government services do not enhance private sector productivity. In this 
framework, the tax distortions created by government could only be balanced against the 
utility gains achieved by the government from lower output volatility. To simplify matters, 
this analysis will focus on small countries within the Euro area (or pegged to the Euro), 
assuming therefore that nominal interest rates are determined exogenously by area wide 
considerations. 
 
The study of utility-adding and productivity-enhancing government services goes back at 
least to Adam Smith and had a resurgence with for example Barro (1990), Baxter and King 
(1993), and Turnovsky and Fisher (1995). Barro employs a simple growth model with 
government services entering both the consumption and production function. Government 
services are provided free of charge—their costs are paid by a flat-rate income tax—and no 
congestion externalities are present. Government services are a normal consumption good 
subject to diminishing marginal utility, while the Cobb-Douglas production function exhibits 
constant returns to scale. To simplify matters, Barro assumes no population growth and a 
fixed labor supply.  
                                            Y  =  f (K, G; L) = f (k, g) L           y = Y/L 
 
                                             y  =  f (k, g) =  k  •  g 
  
Barro derives the conditions for optimal size of government as:   
 
                                                          g/y  =  α 
 
                                                 
14 The focus on aggregate demand rather than the contributions of composition holds generally in the economic 
literature on fiscal policy as observed by Alesina and Perotti (1995). Some exceptions to this generalization 
include Finn (1998), Lane and Perotti (2003) and van der Ploeg (2006). 
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The ratio of government services per capita to income per capita is equal to the coefficient on 
government services given by the Cobb-Douglas production function. The government sets 
its share of gross domestic product (g/y) equal to the share that would derive if government 
services were produced under competition by the private sector. As there is no government 
debt in this model, the ratio of government taxes to income is equal to the ratio of 
government services to income, or alpha. Barro also demonstrates that decentralized 
decision-making can lead to suboptimal rates of economic growth and social welfare, 
introducing a role for government into this class of models.  
 
From a macroeconomic policy perspective, Baxter and King (1993) developed a quantitative 
neoclassical model wherein government service enhanced utility and productivity but without 
altering the marginal utility of private consumption or the marginal product of private factors 
of production. Thus, government capital does not affect, on the margin, consumption or 
production decisions by the private sector. Following Barro, no government debt is assumed 
and the budget is therefore always balanced. Within this construct and given the parameter 
values, Baxter and King find that the long-run multipliers for a permanent increase in 
government infrastructure spending is substantially higher—by 4 to 13 times, depending on 
the productivity of government capital. Their highest value replicated highest estimate 
obtained by Aschauer (1989). Not surprisingly, they conclude that the composition of 
government spending can play an important role in determining the evolution of economic 
activity and that further empirical work was needed to determine the impact of various types 
of government spending on private sector productivity. In this discourse, the role of 
infrastructure investment by government in enhancing growth received considerable attention 
prompted by the seminal contribution by Aschauer (1989) and surveyed by Gramlich (1994). 
Some have disputed the empirical evidence for a positive link between public capital and 
private output (e.g., Tatom (1991), Garcia-Mila, McGuire, and Porter (1996)) or found the 
results from various studies to be less than clear cut (IMF (2004)).   
 
The above models assume perfect competition, no nominal or real rigidities, Ricardian 
equivalence, and perfect foresight. More recently, efforts have been made to embed utility-
adding and productivity-enhancing government services into DSGE frameworks for open 
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economies that relax these assumptions. In particular using a two country new open economy 
macroeconomic model, Ganelli and Tervala (2007) focus on the intertemporal tradeoff 
between public spending that adds to private utility now or later (i.e., productivity-
enhancing). They assume that the utility provided by public consumption is low compared to 
that provided by private consumption and that it enters the household utility function in an 
additive and separable manner. (The first assumption implies that the provision of 
government services exceeds the optimum or its composition is not targeted adequately to the 
needs of consumers. This outcome could result from the political economy processes 
associated with budget formulation. The second assumption means that government services 
are not substitutes for privately provided goods, simplifying the analytical problem. It is also 
consistent with the idea that the government provides services such as the common defense, 
domestic security, and legal protection.) The productivity of public capital was parameterized 
to be less than the intertemporal discount rate. No private capital exists in this model; thus, 
any productivity enhancement is effectively labor augmenting. A one-for-one shift from 
public consumption—utility adding now—to public investment—productivity enhancing—
increases the present value of social welfare of the home country.
15 The higher the 
productivity enhancement, the greater is the increase in the present value of social welfare. 
This combination of productivity shock and lower consumption utility widens the current 
account deficit of the home country.  
 
Productivity-enhancing public spending has also been introduced into GIMF (Kumhof and 
Laxton (2007)). Both consumption and investment spending by the government could 
enhance private productivity, although the latter is substantially more than the former; in 
earlier specifications, government consumption spending had zero impact. For expositional 
ease and because public capital makes a more durable contribution, we will focus only on 
government investment spending, which augments public capital,  , which is also subject 








t G K g K + − = + + ) 1 ( 1 1 δ  
                                                 
15 A negative impact could occur when the productivity of public capital is relatively low and the weight of 
public consumption in utility is relatively high.  
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Public capital is available to the private sector without a user fee, which is effectively paid by 
the taxpayer. Public capital is assumed to enhance the productivity of the distribution system. 
In particular, the domestically-produced, tradables-nontradables composite is scaled up by 
the public capital stock: 
 






α ) )( ( ) ( =  
 
Final output consists of this domestically-produced composite and the foreign-produced final 
output composite. Under this framework, public capital does not effect the domestic 
production processes for traded and nontraded goods themselves. Instead, public capital 
enhances the productivity of the distribution system—the creation of the domestically-
produced composite of tradable and nontradables. This treatment of productivity 
enhancement by public capital is different from the approach adopted by Barro and others 
wherein public capital enters the firms’ production function just like labor and private capital 
(i.e., public capital can substitute for private capital and labor), rather it is separable and 
multiplicative for distributors. This means that distributors’ input decisions on the margin are 
not influenced by the availability of public capital. Moreover, manufacturing firms—both in 
the tradable and nontradable sectors—do not benefit directly from public capital. Clearly 
therefore, these firms’ input decisions are not influenced by the availability of public capital.    
 
In calibrating this model, the depreciation rate δ is assumed equal to 4 percent, while the 
public capital stock is assumed to scale-up private sector productivity in factor neutral 
manner.
16 As already noted, the empirical literature on public investment/capital and real 
growth has yielded a wide range of estimates. Indeed as observed by Gramlich (1994), 
In’t  Veld (2007), Straub and Tchakarov (2007) and others, the upper end of this range 
implies extremely high elasticities for the long-run output response to public capital. Such 
                                                 
16 A 4 percent depreciation rate for public capital was employed by Kumhof and Laxton (2007), drawing upon 
evidence from Kamps (2004). Subsequently Botman, Karam, Laxton, and Rose (2007), and Straub and 
Tchakarov (2007) have used the same depreciation rate. In’t Veld (2007) modifies the DGFIN’s QUEST model 
to add public capital to the aggregate Cobb-Douglas function. Their accumulation equation for public capital is 
the same as presented here and utilized a depreciation rate of 4 percent.    
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elasticities appear implausible because easy gains on output could be achieved by increasing 
investment.
17 On the other hand, as shown by Kumar, Leigh, and Plekhanov (2007), an 
output elasticity of 0.14 coupled with a depreciation rate of 4 percent and public investment 
of 3 percent of GDP implies an average annualized rate of return on public investment of 
about 3.1 percent. This rate of return is low compared to the risk-free long-run real interest 
rate (2 percent), the rate of return on private investment; and households’ discount rate. The 
global private equity premium—the difference between the risk-free real interest rate on 
government bonds and rate of return on private equities—has averaged around 4-5 percent, 
although it has varied considerably decade to decade. Therefore, the output elasticity for 
public investment was set at 0.20.  
 
The implications can be illustrated by comparing a government investment shock in 
situations where public capital does not enhance private sector productivity and where it 
does. In this simulation, the higher level of government investment (equivalent to 1 percent 
of GDP) is financed by an offsetting reduction in government consumption, leaving total 
spending government constant. (This simulation is different from the analysis under taken by 
In’t Veld (2007) wherein higher government investment spending was financed by EU 
transfers. While the initial impact of this higher spending on the debt-financed deficit is zero, 
such spending adds to domestic demand unlike simulation considered here. Both simulations 
have modeled the supply impact in similarly.) If the public capital does not enhance private-
sector productivity, the demand impact of higher government investment is zero because 
consumption spending is reduced correspondingly (Figure 3).  
                                                 
17 For example, In’t Veld (2007) in modifying the QUEST model set the marginal product of public capital 
equal to the marginal product of private capital for each EU economy but allowing it to vary across economies. 
He argued that if the marginal product of public capital (e.g., for infrastructure) were greater than private 
capital, then the level of output could be increased by raising corporate taxes, which would lower private 
capital, to finance greater the accumulation of a larger pubic capital stock. Thus, the assumption of an equal 
marginal productivity requires a socially optimal level of public capital. For government education and research 
and development expenditures, total factor productivity is raised over time. Implicitly, this means that 
investment in human capital and R&D was socially suboptimal initially. Kumhof and Laxton (2007) employ an 
elasticity of aggregate output with respect to public capital of 0.14 based upon a meta analysis by Ligthart and 
Suárez (2005). This estimate is lower than found in some other studies (e.g., Aschauer (1989) or Gramlich 
(1994)). Straub and Tchakarov (2007) calibrate their model such that the long run multiplier for government 
investment gradually rises to 2.  
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Figure 3. Output Response to Government Investment 
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Figure 4
Response of Key Macroeconomic Variables to
Permanent Government Investment Increase 1/ 
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Figure 5
Response of Key Macroeconomic Variables to
Permanent Government Investment Increase 1/ 
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If public capital does enhance private sector productivity, the supply impact of increased 
government investment builds up over time as the public capital stock reaches its new higher 
steady state level; the direct demand impact from government spending is still zero in this 
case. However, enhanced productivity in the private sector means that real output in the long 
run is lifted by more than 4 percent compared to its steady state. Higher consumption and 
investment by the private validate this supply response. This result is broadly similar to those 
obtained by In’t Veld (2007) on average for New Member States. One interesting difference 
is that his analysis included countries that had independent monetary policy with flexible 
exchange rates, which ceteris paribus, mutes the output and inflation responses in the near 
term (as observed in In’t Veld’s paper and separately confirmed here in unpublished 
findings). If the government financed its higher spending on productive investment by 
borrowing, the output response will be somewhat dampened, owing to the need for higher 
future taxes, but with less than full-Ricardian offset by consumers.    
 
The responses of key macroeconomic variables to a permanent increase in productive 
government investment are shown in Figures 4 and 5 for deficit neutral and debt financed, 
respectively. Given their similarity in outcomes between these two scenarios, we will focus 
only on the deficit-neutral scenario (Figure 4) in order to highlight the behavior of the private 
sector. As the productivity-enhancing effects of government investment spending is known to 
all economic agents, they respond immediately within the constraints posed by various 
adjustment costs and credit-constraints. In particular, private consumption by OG households 
rises immediately reflecting their higher net wealth—the present value of higher output. 
Their higher wealth and income will increase their consumption of leisure, reducing their 
hours worked and pushing up real wages. As public capital reaches its new steady state level, 
the productivity of private capital rises, exerting a positive impact on the marginal 
productivity of labor and equilibrium real wage. Owing to its increased productivity, private 
investment will increase in the steady state—as will the private capital stock—contributing 
thereby to the permanently higher output level. However, the initial impact on private 
investment is negative because it is postponed to the future in order to capture more of the 
benefits from the rising stock of productivity-enhancing public capital. After a period of 
investment “shortfall”, a “catch up” period follows before the new steady state is reached. 
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With increased domestic supply and a fixed nominal exchange rate, inflation diminishes 
slightly, lifting the equilibrium real interest rate. Greater domestic supply also improves the 
trade balance as production of tradables is enhanced along with nontradables.   
   
Building infrastructure is not the only avenue by which government spending can enhance 
private sector productivity. Current government spending on education and healthcare can 
also increase private sector productivity, increasing effectively labor supply. To model, this 
avenue current government spending is split between consumption goods (e.g., fire and 
policies protection) and current spending on education and healthcare. A dynamic equation 
for public human capital formation from government current spending on education/health 
services was specified along the same lines as for government investment spending and 
public capital. Output elasticity for human capital is calibrated to be somewhat higher than 
the elasticity for public capital based on various empirical studies (for example, European 
Commission (2003)). However, this spending accumulates net human capital more slowly 
than public physical capital, which still continues to enhance private sector productivity. 
Kumhof and Laxton (2007), Straub and Tchakarov (2007) and In’t Veld (2007) have also 
introduced productivities current government spending into DSGE models. Qualitatively, this 
introduction produces similar results as the introduction of productive public physical capital. 
Thus, at this stage, this approach serves primarily as an essential reminder of the importance 
of government current spending, avoiding an artificial characterization of government 
investment as productive and current spending as unproductive, albeit possibly utility-
enhancing. This distinction would allow in the future to treat government spending on 
education/healthcare as a labor-augmenting and government spending on infrastructure as 
capital-augmenting. Such treatments would add an instrument to the policy toolkit.   
  
The differential effects of productive government spending and a pure government 
consumption spending is explained by private wealth effects stimulating private consumption 
of OLG households. When public consumption is increased on a permanent basis, OLG 
households recognized that the intertemporal government budget constraint means that taxes 
will need to be raised in the future, increasing the net value of tax liabilities and reducing net 
wealth. On the other hand, when productive government spending is increased on a 
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permanent basis, the productivity of the private sector is increased, rising output. The present 
value of this higher output path adds to wealth net of increased tax liabilities, if the 
productivity elasticity is sufficiently high. The private sector supply-response associated in 
with higher public capital will tend to lessen pressures on prices and given a nominal interest 
rate set based on area wide considerations, real interest rate variability will decline.  
 
To introduce an explicit role for government in the economy other than demand 
management, it is assumed that government goods and services enter into the household 
utility function in an additive and separable manner from privately supplied goods and 
services. This treatment of the household utility function is consistent with previous studies 
(see Barro (1990), Baxter and King (1993), Ganelli and Tervala (2007)). This treatment 
implies that current government spending is not wasteful. Instead it is utility enhancing, 
providing a obvious justification for such government spending within the model. 
Furthermore at the previously calibrated steady state, it is assumed that the households’ 
marginal utilities are equal at the existing ratios to GDP of government consumption 
spending and private consumption spending.
18 Government spending on education/healthcare 
is assumed not to be consumed, but it continues to be treated as an investment in public 
human capital. (This treatment of education/healthcare is made to simplify the analysis and is 
not intended to deny the consumption or utility enhancing characteristics of either.) The 
government supplies public goods and services only in kind, expanding the households’ 
budget constraints in a nonfungible manner. As a consequence, the households’ solution to 
their utility maximization problem is not affected, including the labor-leisure trade off and 
intertemporal choices. The political-economy of the budget process determines the desired 
composition of government spending, including assessing the ramifications for income 
distribution and social welfare. The level and composition of government spending and taxes 
are therefore given exogenously to the model.  
                                                 
18 One could assume that households’ marginal utility of government consumption goods is higher/lower than 
the marginal utility of private consumption goods and calibrate the slopes of those marginal utility curves. 
Using a search algorithm over this utility calibration, the “optimal” split between government and private 
consumption could be determined by the model. This approach reveals in a quantitative form the otherwise 
implicit preferences of the modeler/decision-maker.    
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Endogenous determination—optimization—of government spending and taxes is left for 
future research. This optimization problem could be further enriched by moving from a 
composite government good to disaggregate consumption goods with differentiated utility 
gains; making government-produced goods substitutes for privately-produced goods in the 
household utility function; and introducing cash government transfers, allowing households 
to maximize their utility by shifting between public and private goods. Even without these 
extensions, the present model can provide some insights into choices between government 
consumption spending and government spending on education/healthcare and investment.  
 
Using the GIMF’s calibrations, intertemporal tradeoffs can be analyzed, particularly the 
choice between less consumption of government goods and services now, which would 
reduce household utility, and investment in public human capital and infrastructure, which 
would increase private output in the future, rising household utility. This choice depends 
crucially upon the rate of return of these government investments, the marginal utility of 
consumption of government goods, and the households’ discount rate; Ganelli and Tervala 
(2007) reach a similar conclusion using a different model. Moreover, the government could 
decide to increase government consumption goods financing the increase by the higher 
spending by distortionary taxes, which would reduce labor supply or private investment, or 
debt creation, which would rise real interest rates, crowding out private investment. 
Households would gain by consuming more government goods initially but at a cost of less 
private sector goods either now or in the future. If the rate of return on public investment was 
higher than on private investment, it could make sense to tax private capital to finance higher 
public investment. Deficit-financing of higher public investment provides another option to 
reducing government current expenditure. These results are very similar because firms are 
Ricardian in assessing the future tax liabilities unlike households. 
    
Simulations show that the output response to a permanent increase in productive government 
spending of 1 percentage point of GDP would lift output by over 5 percent in the long run. 
This outcome contrasts with the unchanged long run impact of government spending when it 
has no productive effect on the private sector. This result appears robust to changes in how 
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that increase in productive government spending is financed—lower consumptions spending, 
higher corporate taxes, or a wider deficit. A lower output elasticity for government 
productive spending would dampen the long-run output response but does not change these 
qualitatively conclusions. Do these results imply that governments are under spending on 
productivity enhancing programs? Possibly but not necessarily. A complete answer depends 
on households’ marginal utility of consumption from goods and services provided by the 
government and private sectors as well as the households’ discount rate, myopia, risk 
aversion, and life spans. The government may also have a longer time horizon than 
households and risk tolerance.      
 
Turning from spending to production, it is assumed that the government produces two 
outputs—a consumption good (s
) and education/health services (s²). Both government 
outputs can provided through a single government production function, which utilizes labor 
that is purchased from unions, competing directly with private firms.
19 The labor force which 
is always fully employed in DGSE models, is divided between those employed by the private 
sector and the public sector. Households are assumed to be indifferent between working for 
the government or the private sector and households are assumed to have the same labor-
leisure preference as previously—the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is unchanged. This 
implies that the government must pay households the same wage rate as the private sector. 
The government’s demand for labor depends on the scale of its production and the labor 
intensity of production.  
 
Data on government production of goods and services is not readily available. From the 
national income accounts, data on government spending for goods and services, which 
excludes transfers, was obtained as a proxy. Under the assumption that the government 
produces all or a fixed share of government consumption spending, a very rough calibration 
is possible. As is well known, considerable cross-country variation exists in the size of 
                                                 
19 At the cost of considerable complication, public investment could be dedicated to accumulating public capital 
(e.g., infrastructure) that benefits the private sector and separately public capital that is utilized by the 
government (e.g., schools, hospitals). 
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government based on expenditures, although once transfers for social programs (e.g., 
pensions, social safety nets) are excluded, cross-country differences in the share of public 
consumption expenditure in GDP are narrowed but eliminated. The lowest ratios for 2006 are 
found in Hungary, Ireland and the United States and the highest ratios in Denmark, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden (Table 1). For the New Member States, these 2006 ratios were on 
average lower by about 3½ percentage points than in the unweighted average for the other 
European countries. (Excluding Hungary, which is an outlier, the difference would be about 
2¼ percentage points.) Over the period, these spending ratios have tended to move lower 
among the New Member States, while for other countries in this sample, including Canada 
and the United States, these ratios have tended to be stable on average.   
 
Turning to government employment, statistics exist for general government but this data does 
not permit a further functional disaggregation. Government employment data can be a 
significant share of total employment. This share has varied widely across selected countries 
during 2000-2006 (Table 2). The period average lows were found in United States 
(14.2 percent), Italy (15.1 percent) and Spain (15.6 percent), while the period average highs 
were in Denmark (36.8 percent), Sweden (34.8 percent), and Finland (32.3 percent). Turning 
to New Member States, their unweighted period average was slightly about 30 percent, but 
this average masks a wide range and a generalized decline over the period albeit to different 
degrees. Over the period 2000-2006, the largest declines in government employment shares 
was observed in Slovak Republic (9  percentage points) and the Baltic countries (about 
7½ percentage points); modest declines (on the order of slightly more than 1 percentage  
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Table 1. Public Consumption Expenditure in Constant Prices 
(In percent of GDP) 
         
   Year 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 
                       
Europe – EU Members         
Denmark 25.1 25.5 25.9 26.0 25.9 25.3  24.9 
Finland 20.3 20.0 20.2 20.2 19.8 19.6  18.8 
France 22.9 22.7 22.9 23.1 23.1 22.9  22.8 
Germany 19.0 18.9 19.1 19.3 18.8 18.7  18.4 
Greece 15.7 15.1 15.5 14.6 14.3 13.7 13.6 
Ireland 14.6 15.2 15.3 14.8 14.4 14.2  14.1 
Italy 18.4 18.8 19.1 19.5 19.6 19.9  19.4 
Luxembourg 15.1 15.6 15.7 16.2 16.1 16.2  15.6 
Netherlands 22.0 22.5 23.3 23.9 23.3 23.0  24.4 
Portugal 19.3 19.6 19.9 20.1 20.3 20.7  20.3 
Spain 17.4 17.4 17.8 18.0 18.6 18.9  19.1 
Sweden 26.3 26.3 26.4 26.1 25.2 24.5  24.0 
U.K. 20.4 20.4 20.7 20.8 20.8 21.0  20.8 
         
New Member States         
Czech Republic  21.1 21.3 22.3 23.1 21.4 20.5 19.5 
Estonia 21.0 20.2 19.3 18.2 17.3 16.2  15.1 
Hungary 10.1 9.8 9.9 10.0 9.5 9.1  8.8 
Latvia 20.8 19.8 19.0 18.0 17.0 15.7  14.6 
Lithuania 21.3 20.5 19.5 18.4 18.4 18.0  17.9 
Poland 17.4 17.7 17.7 17.8 17.5 17.7  17.4 
Slovak Republic  20.9 21.1 21.4 21.3 20.9 19.5  18.7 
Slovenia 18.2 18.3 18.3 18.1 17.9 17.7  17.5 
         
Other Countries         
Canada 19.2 19.6 19.5 19.7 19.6 19.4  19.5 
U.S. 14.4 14.8 15.2 15.2 14.9 14.5  14.3 
         
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO).       
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Table 2. Government Employment in Selected Industrial Countries 
(In percent of total employment) 
         
   Year 
Country 2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 
                   
Europe – EU Members      
Denmark 37.3  36.7 36.9 36.6 36.9 36.9  36.4 
Finland 31.4  31.7 32.0 32.4 33.0 32.9  32.8 
France 22.3  22.1 22.3 22.5 22.6 22.6  22.7 
Germany 26.9  26.9 27.3 27.6 27.5 27.8  27.8 
Greece 21.1  21.0 21.3 21.5 23.0 22.0 22.6 
Ireland 19.0  19.6 19.8 19.7 19.5 18.8  18.4 
Italy 15.5  15.4 15.3 15.1 14.9 14.9  14.7 
Luxembourg 11.4  11.0 10.9 11.0 11.0 10.9  … 
Netherlands 25.1  26.1 26.6 27.5 27.3 27.3  27.3 
Portugal 22.5  22.9 23.6 24.1 25.0 25.7  25.6 
Spain 15.7  15.5 15.4 15.6 15.6 15.5  15.6 
Sweden 35.7  34.6 35.1 35.2 35.0 34.8  34.4 
U.K. 19.2  19.4 19.7 20.0 20.3 20.4  20.1 
      
New Member States      
Czech Republic  22.8  22.0 21.7 21.6 21.6 …  … 
Estonia 34.0  32.0 30.0 29.0 29.0 27.0  27.0 
Hungary 30.8  30.8 31.2 31.5 31.4 …  … 
Latvia 41.6  40.0 39.5 38.4 36.3 35.1  33.9 
Lithuania 34.0  33.5 30.1 28.1 27.9 27.7  26.3 
Poland 34.4  32.0 32.5 32.2 30.5 29.9  29.4 
Slovakia 33.2  31.5 29.4 27.3 26.2 24.6  24.1 
Slovenia 30.5  30.5 30.3 31.3 31.2 30.8  29.4 
      
Other Industrial Countries      
Canada 19.0  19.0 19.0 18.9 19.1 19.3  19.4 
U.S. 14.1  14.1 14.4 14.3 14.3 14.4  14.1 
         
Sources: National statistical websites and LABORSTA (ILO).     
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point) were recorded in Slovenia and the Czech Republic.
20 The largest increase in the share 
of government employment was seen in Portugal (slightly over 3 percentage points). This 
data shows that significant shifts in employment shares can take place over short time span. 
Thus, changes in government employment can materially add or substrate from the pool of 
labor available to the private sector, opening a supply-side impact to go along with the 
traditional aggregate demand impact. This supply-side impact can be viewed as a technology 
shock to the firms’ production function or as shock to the economy’s labor endowment.  
 
If the government reduces production of consumption goods (say to finance more productive 
spending), it will release government labor into the private sector work force. The labor force 
is assumed homogenous across sectors and firms and labor market adjustment costs/rigidities 
are the identical for all workers regardless of past employers. The influx of labor available 
for the private sector production will increase output in the short-run even with a fixed 
capital stock. For a CES production function, the input intensity parameter and the elasticity 
of substitution (σ) determine the output response; assuming an elasticity of substitution equal 
to one or above implies that marginal product of labor will not approach zero as labor 
increases.
21 At the same time, the marginal product of capital will increase, increasing the 
incentive for firms to invest and for OLG households to save. As a result, the private-output 
response will be greater than when government labor is not released to the private sector.   
 
To isolate this labor-shedding channel, we have only stimulated the deficit-neutral case—
wherein a reduction in government consumption spending releases labor to the private sector, 
while at the same time a corresponding increase in government spending occurs that 
enhances the productivity of private sector capital. The output response path is shown in 
                                                 
20  Elsewhere, government employment shares during this period exhibited mixed trends. Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom ended the period with a higher 
share than they began the period. Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden had lower shares in 2006 than in 2000. 
Spain and the United States exhibited no trend over this period.    
 
21 For a Cobb-Douglas production function (σ = 0), the marginal product of labor is always positive but it will 
decrease monotonically to zero. A Cobb-Douglas production function results in constant labor/capital shares.  In 
the steady state, GIMF is calibrated to achieve specified labor/capital shares but these shares can be allowed to 
move in the short run consistent with CES production functions.   
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Figure 6, while the implications for other key macroeconomic variables is presented in 
Figure 7. Real output in the long run is above ½ percentage point higher with government 
labor shedding than without it, although the shorter run gains can be larger—at roughly 
1 percentage point. The channels through which the increased labor supply to the private 
sector affects this economy are several. One, the marginal productivity of private capital is 
higher owing to greater availability of labor to firms at unchanged real wage. The unchanged 
equilibrium real wage stems from the assumption that workers in the government or private 
sector are paid their marginal product and households have no (risk) preference for working 
in one sector or the other. Consequently, the private investment responds faster in the near 
term with government labor shedding than without. With the stronger output response with 
government labor shedding, inflation is moderated by slightly more than ½ percentage point, 
lifting real interest rates commensurately in light of the assumed fixed nominal interest rate. 
Lower real interest rates will contribute to higher private investment and increased 
consumption by OG households along with the wealth effects. Liquidity-constrained 
households will not raise their consumption because their real wages (income) remain 
basically unchanged compared with the scenario with no labor shedding by the government.  
 
Private output trends do not necessarily correspond to welfare developments. Lower output 
for government consumption goods will reduce household utility even as higher private 
output of consumption goods increases household utility. The net impact on welfare depends 
on the marginal utilities associated with consumption of the private and public goods and the 
marginal productivities of labor in the two sectors. If as commonly assumed labor is more 
productive in the private sector than in the public sector,
22 lower government production of 
its consumption good is welfare enhancing unless the government consumption good has a 
sufficiently higher marginal utility for households than private goods. 
                                                 
22 Data on real GDP (less government consumption) divided by private employment compared to public 
consumption divided by public employment support this conjecture for some countries but not for others. 
However, the shortcomings with this simple measure and the data do not allow this question to be settled. 
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Figure 6. Output Response to Permanent Government Investment with/without 
Government Labor Shedding
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, the role of government in the economy has been examined within a DSGE 
approach, in particular the Fund’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal (GIMF) Model, 
which was calibrated for a small Euro-area economy or small EU member with a pegged 
exchange rate. This calibration was not intended to formulate policy advice for specific EU 
members but to illustrate that the influence of fiscal policy can extend beyond demand 
management. The composition of government spending can be important for household 
utility, for private sector productivity, and for labor availability to the private sector. 
Governments therefore need to confront several tradeoffs when deciding the composition of 
public spending (and taxes) even if the deficit is not changed. This framework can also 
provide a quantitative tool to examine the optimal size of government—the split between 
consumption goods provided by the government and by the private sector. These decisions 
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1/ Deficit financed with productive government spending financed by lower 
government consumption with labor shedding.
Figure 7
Response of Key Macroeconomic Variables to 
Permanent Government Investment Increase 1/
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have an intertemporal dimension in part owing to the choice between supplying government 
consumption goods now or investing to enhance the productivity of the private sector, which 
permits higher future consumption. In addition, the government can borrow (equivalent to 
taxing future households) to finance current consumption by households or government 
spending to enhance private sector productivity. In a world with distortionary taxes and 
nominal and real rigidities, it is no easy task for policy makers to find a solution that 
maximizes social welfare even without uncertainty about calibrations!   
 
Nonetheless, this analysis demonstrates that the composition of productive public spending 
can have significant implications for the economy and social welfare in the long run; this 
contrasts with the unchanged long-run impact of government spending when it has no 
productive effect on the private sector. Based on the calibrations employed, the impact of 
permanently higher productive government spending dominates considerations of how it is 
financed—lower consumption spending, higher corporate taxes, or a wider deficit—so long 
as fiscal sustainability is preserved. Does this conclusion imply that governments are under 
spending on productivity enhancing programs? Not necessarily. A complete answer depends 
on households’ marginal utility of consumption from goods and services provided by the 
government and private sectors as well as the households’ discount rate, myopia, risk 
aversion, and life spans. The government may also have a longer time horizon than 
households and risk tolerance. Income distribution considerations, including social safety 
nets, which have not played a role in the present analysis, are important elements in budget 
deliberations.  
 
A key message from this analysis is that while traditional macroeconomic stabilization 
objectives remain a central element of fiscal policy, the allocative (and distributional) aspects 
can be studied using a DSGE approach. For countries whose only macroeconomic tool is 
fiscal policy, the size and composition of government spending can provide important 
channels for improving economic performance and social welfare.  
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